Agreement under Great Compromise
enero 25, 2022
Americas Master Option Confirmation Agreement
enero 26, 2022
Mostrar todo

Aka Agreement

AKA – Authentication and Key Agreement alias 3G Authentication, Enhanced Subscriber Authorization (ESA). Individuals and organizations working with arXivLabs have embraced and accepted our values of openness, community, excellence, and the protection of user data. arXiv is committed to these values and only works with partners who adhere to them. Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) is a security protocol used in 3G networks. AKA is also used for the OTP generation mechanism for Digest access authentication. AKA is a challenge-response-based mechanism that uses symmetric cryptography. An attack has been reported on all variants of AKA, including 5G.[1] AKA, a mechanism that performs authentication and session key distribution over Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) networks. AKA is a challenge-response-based mechanism that uses symmetric cryptography. AKA typically runs in an IP UMTS Multimedia Services Identity Module (ISIM), which is an application on a Universal Integrated Circuit Board (UICC). AKA is defined in RFC 3310. As the basis of the 3G authentication mechanism, which is defined as the successor to CAVE-based authentication, AKA provides mutual authentication methods for the mobile station (MS) and service system.

The successful execution of AKA leads to the creation of a security association (i.e. a set of security data) between the MS and the service system, which allows the provision of a number of security services. TIA-41 MAP support for AKA was defined in TIA-945 (3GPP2 X.S0006), which was integrated into TIA-41 (3GPP2 X.S0004). We demonstrate the practical applicability and efficiency benefits of such multi-UIM scenarios. As the main contribution, we adapt AKA to this parameter, with minimal changes, while respecting aka design objectives and retaining its benefits and features. Our protocol includes an additional PRFG assessment and no additional messages. We officially demonstrate the security of the resulting protocol. We discuss how our improved security is simplifying some AKA security heuristics, making our protocol more efficient and robust than AKA, even for current deployment scenarios. SNA 2010: Security and Cryptography for Pp 235-252 | Networks Cite as AKA is not yet implemented in CDMA2000 networks, although it should be used for IMS. To ensure interoperability with current devices and partner networks, AKA support in CDMA networks and handsets will likely be in addition to CAVE-based authentication. The vulnerabilities arise because AKA is not a secure feature in the standard cryptographic sense because the (mathcal{C}) client does not randomly contribute to the session key.

We argue that AKA remains secure in current deployments where (mathcal{C}) is an entity controlled by a single tamper-proof user identity module (UIM). However, we also show that AKA is not secure when multiple devices/IMM of the client share their identity and key. The full version of this article can be found in the ePrint archives [8]. For more information on AKA roaming, see CDG Reference Document No. 138. Key advantages of AKA-based authentication over CAVE include: Air interface support for AKA is included in all CDMA2000 Rev C versions. arXivLabs is a framework that allows employees to develop and share new arXiv features directly on our website. .

Comments are closed.

Uso de cookies

Este sitio web utiliza cookies para que usted tenga la mejor experiencia de usuario. Si continúa navegando está dando su consentimiento para la aceptación de las mencionadas cookies y la aceptación de nuestra política de cookies, pinche el enlace para mayor información.

Aviso de cookies